Volume , - Issue 1. Published online: 10 Feb Views: Article. Chapter Six: Asia. Volume , - Issue 1. Published online: 10 Feb THE MILITARY BALANCE and the Air黍rne Assault Troops (VDV)ǰ which have long 菊en given priority over regular ground forces in. NY: The International Institute For Strategic Studies, p. The Military Balance is an authoritative assessment of the military capabilities.
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The Military Balance is an authoritative assessment of the military capabilities and defence economics of countries. Detailed A–Z entries list each country's . The Military Balance - Free ebook download as PDF File .pdf), Text File . txt) or read book online for free. The Military Balance is an authoritative. Welcome to the launch of The Military Balance , the annual assessment of global military capabilities and defence economics from the IISS. Joining me to.
Furthermore, what should be done with the cruise-missile airframe once the mission is completed? Cohen, Ariel. Semi-automated, simultaneous multifunction performance. Direct Line with Vladimir Putin, April Submarines remain a key requirement for states across Asia. These lessons might not necessarily be applied in conflicts with Western states, but their potential to rapidly destabilise the existing order could, if applied in other zones of political and military competition, mean they have global ramifications. Changes indicated here highlight the short-term trend in planned defence spending between and
Indeed, some Arab states, particularly in the Gulf, demonstrated their increasing strategic extroversion. The actions of both the United Arab Emirates and Egypt over their reported activity in Libya in marked something of a watershed in regional politics, illustrating a potential to use force and the capacity to operate independent of Washington. For all that, the US remained the strategic guarantor for most regional states, and still brought to bear unique military and political capabilities.
Some Gulf states calculated that ISIS was becoming an ideological and security threat; they also believed that their involvement was essential to shape US strategy in Syria and to ensure that Iran would not be a principal beneficiary of the campaign. The potential for hybrid incidents also worried states in other parts of the world. Attempts to strengthen capabilities in the Asia-Pacific have focused particularly though not exclusively on the maritime domain, reflecting worries about conventional naval threats, as well as concerns over the need to defend natural resources, territorial claims and freedom of navigation.
The biggest spender remained China. This increased spending has provided for growing military procurement, the most news-. These states are making greater efforts to acquire and absorb foreign technologies and they are overhauling their existing defence-innovation systems. Chinas technical advances in the defence sphere are legion, and are leveraging the resources of the defence as well as, in some cases, the national commercial sector even if gaps remain, such as in advanced turbofan engines for high-performance combat aircraft.
This rapid progress has led some in the US defence establishment to claim that the technology gap that hitherto allowed the US armed forces technological dominance is closing. Mindful of the differing trajectories in the two countries defence budgets, US officials emphasise the need for continued innovation and the Pentagon is attempting to minimise potential vulnerabilities in its weapons systems arising from other states technical developments.
For instance, Washington is assessing its dependence on space, including GPS, and there has been greater attention to developing more resilient space systems and satellite constellations, as well as scrutiny of established technologies such as inertial navigation that could minimise the effects of these vulnerabilities on weapons systems.
While many countries will only have been affected tangentially by events in Ukraine, Syria and Iraq, even if there might have been incidents inspired by events in the Middle East, the lessons that potential adversaries could draw from these might be of greater long-term relevance. As such, their military planners will study these lessons in detail; but there will be as much interest in how the defence and security establishments of key states in the West and the Gulf, as well as in Russia and Eurasia react and adapt.
For the US, unanticipated events like these were among the possible risks to the countrys armed forces highlighted in the Quadrennial Defense Review.
Though the QDR, according to the US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, largely protected certain capabilities, it also takes risk in the capacity of each service, but particularly in land forces.
On current trajectories, cuts to land forces will continue in many states and US Army chiefs are reported as saying that personnel strength might drop to around , That total, of course, dwarfs many other armed forces, but calculations change when the numbers are teased apart.
According to. General Raymond Odierno, 55, are deployed troops, and 80, are stationed abroad in countries; others will doubtless be forming part of the deployment cycle. Previous strategies had assumed that the demand for land forces would decline, but has seen additional even if small-scale Western land forces deploy to Eastern Europe and Iraq, and Russian ground forces played a key role in shaping operations in eastern Ukraine.
The complex nature of some of these tasks might also lead to further questions about whether armed forces are even best suited for some of these complex crises, certainly those that require security attention short of.
It is unlikely that budget realities in the West will see forces grow once more, but that places a premium on policymakers and defence planners providing a suitable force mix and spectrum of capabilities, and generating adaptive military and security capacities able to deploy rapidly and operate across all domains.
States also have to ensure nimble EW, IO, cyber and strategic-communications capacities so that they can operate in the information realm as well as in military theatres. Directed energy weapons: Directed energy DE systems have been something of a chimera for defence planners.
From their first appearances in science fiction, to the ambitious s United States Strategic Defense Initiative SDI , they have been touted by advocates of the technology as a means of engaging military targets with, in the case of lasers, speed-of-light delivery and the possibility of near-unlimited magazines compared with kineticeffect weapons, such as missiles or guns.
While there has been limited transition from the laboratory and related test environments into weapons systems suitable and ready for operational exploitation, in spite of considerable levels of investment since the s, the practical military employment of DE systems is drawing closer. There is now the potential for DE to be adopted far more widely than in the niche applications in which it has been utilised so far, such as vehicle immobilisation.
This is in part because technology has matured, but also because near-term ambitions have been reviewed by defence planners. DE is now seen as a disruptive technology that can potentially provide substantial military benefit at the tactical rather than strategic level with the proviso that such systems must be brought to an appropriate level of maturity for deployment.
Two areas, in particular, have long interested armed forces: These offer the most promise in terms of tactical application. The development of laser weaponry has had several expensive false starts. This exemplified much that was wrong with DE weapons projects. Irrespective of the technical progress made during the programme, the project suffered from over-reach with regard to the maturity of the technology then available, and came in over budget.
Today, the level of ambition, projected target set. Laser systems are currently viewed, in the near term at least, as an adjunct or complement to existing weapons, rather than as direct replacements. In the maritime role, for instance, a laser could provide the ability to engage particular target sets such as fastattack craft or unmanned aerial vehicles UAVs without having to expend a costlier weapon such as a missile, of which vessels will have limited stocks.
Air-defence missiles could then be saved to engage more demanding targets, such as high-speed anti-ship cruise missiles, that remain beyond the power-output abilities of the lasers most likely to enter operational service by There is also interest in using laser weaponry to counter subsonic cruise missiles both at sea and on land either by degrading the performance of or damaging electro-optical EO seekers, or by causing structural damage to the missile airframe.
Power requirements in the hundreds of kilowatts would likely be required for this role. US naval laser research Even though substantial funds have been invested into laser research, and the results have so far been mixed, the projected benefits in cost terms remain a significant motivation for continued military interest in the technology.
Firing a missile to fulfil a similar role costs substantially more, with most of this related to the round itself. With lasers, the costs lie with the engineering architecture required to generate, point and steer a beam of the required power for the requisite period of time; so far these costs have generally been prohibitively high.
For instance, although Israel pursued a counter-rocket laser system with the US the cancelled Mobile Tactical High Energy Laser , it still relies on a kinetic. Recent tests by the USN have been illustrative of the increasing likelihood that DE weaponry will soon be integrated into military platforms. LaWS is a comparatively low-powered 30kW solid-state laser. This modest power level has limited its notional target set to UAVs and fast inshore attack craft usually by targeting the engine block to disable the craft , particularly when engaged in swarm attacks.
Anticipating questions about the compatibility of LaWS with existing ship systems, the USN has said that the system could be directed onto targets from the radar track obtained from a Mk 15 Phalanx Close-In Weapon system or other targeting source.
Indeed, integration with a relatively low-tier tracking and targeting system such as that used in Phalanx could, when allied with its relatively modest power requirement, increase the possibilities of LaWS being integrated more broadly across fleet platforms of varying sizes. The programme will address technical challenges in rugged laser subsystems, optics suitable for maritime environments, and capability to propagate lethal power levels in the maritime atmosphere.
However, while the USN might have ambitions to increase the power output of its laser systems, these are incremental steps towards realising fairly limited objectives. For instance, the power output of LaWS is. While ABL, housed in a Boeing airframe, was first used in to successfully engage a ballistic-missile target at such a range, the project was some distance from providing a system suitable for introduction into general service.
The UK deployed a naval laser weapon, the Laser Dazzle Sight, during the Falklands campaign in , although previously classified documents suggest it was not used in action. As well as examining the utility of medium-power lasers for applications such as air defence, the UK has also pursued since at least the late s projects to defend sensors and personnel against lasers.
The original code name for this activity was Raker, while development projects arising from the research fell under the Shingle programme. These included coatings for EO sensors and attempts to develop eye-safe visors for aircrew. Conversely, the blinding effect of lasers has also been considered by some nations for both defensive and offensive anti-satellite purposes, including China, Russia and the US. Lasers can be used to degrade or disrupt the performance of spacebased EO reconnaissance sensors.
In the UK, there has been ongoing naval interest in laser systems with work streams examining effects, and pointing and tracking requirements. In Germany, MBDA Deutschland has been working under contract to the German defence ministry to develop and test a solid-state laser for the Counter-Rocket, Artillery and Mortar role and against UAVs, either to defeat sensors at extended ranges or to shoot down the air vehicle.
A number of increasingly demanding trials were carried out in and to verify elements of the system, including the ability to engage a mortar round and to automatically acquire and track a highspeed target.
Several possible applications are now being considered including land and naval roles. One option for the former might be to install a kW laser on an armoured vehicle to provide a counter-. UAV capability as a complement to existing missile systems.
While a 10kW laser was due to be tested before the end of , the aim is to have a 30kW laser ready for field-testing during But again, there is no monopoly on this technology. EO sensor countermeasures were examined by the Soviet Union: Radio-frequency weapons While lasers have garnered much attention, RF weapons have also seen both defensive and offensive research activity.
RF systems are more commonly referred to as high-power microwave HPM , and have possible applications across the air, land and sea domains. They provide the potential ability to temporarily or permanently disable systems that rely on computers or electronics by emitting very high-output, short-duration, electromagnetic bursts. Initial work into HPM or RF ordnance conducted in the s by the UK utilised explosive-driven flux compression generators to produce the required energy, although this limited output to single shots.
This led researchers to investigate other technologies, such as Marx Generators, which allow for the voltage of the output discharge to be far higher than the input, to deliver multiple bursts of RF energy. Like laser systems, there have been some niche applications in terms of counter-personnel such as the US Active Denial System, which relies on the sensation of skin heating , counter-vehicle and counter-improvised-explosive-device systems, but the development of stand-off HPM or RF payloads to provide weapons effects has proved more challenging.
Efforts to develop HPM warheads have been under way for at least three decades, and while systems have been tested in the laboratory and in the field, it remains unclear whether any have been.
In common with lasers, though, the possibility is growing that an airdelivered RF weapon might soon be fielded. The CHAMP concept, housed within a cruise-missile airframe, used a compact pulsed-power system to provide a narrowband HPM, with the system capable of generating multiple pulses to engage multiple targets.
Narrowband sources provide high energy output over specific frequencies tailored to the systems they are intended to counter. Broadband, as the name suggests, is a less discriminate output of RF energy. For well over a decade, the UK has been developing and testing HPM payloads capable of cruise-missile delivery, while Russia has also considered an RF warhead for future air-to-air missile applications. The UK has carried out trials of an HPM payload against a variety of simulated targets in order to better understand the effects of this technology.
Challenges to and ramifications of RF weapon use There are, arguably, three basic challenges to the use of an RF warhead: One issue with early HPM systems was that the burst of energy could differ from one shot to the next, with this output variation meaning there was no guarantee the desired effect could be achieved.
BDA during operational use is another problem area for HPM payloads, particularly if the objective is to permanently or temporarily disable a surface-toair missile system radar or a command-and-control node.
Monitoring these may enable the detection of any degradation in capability, but generating such analysis may take time and serve only to generate additional intelligence requirements. A conventional cruise-missile strike, meanwhile even against hardened structures will show a penetration point, and post-detonation indicators may also be available to provide additional BDA data. While a multiple-shot HPM payload has the. For instance, did the HPM payload work as intended or did the target simply shut down operation coincidentally at around the time of the planned engagement?
Furthermore, what should be done with the cruise-missile airframe once the mission is completed? The airframe will likely house sensitive HPM technology should the weapon be recovered like a UAV, or should it be fitted with an explosive warhead to try and ensure the RF elements of the payload are destroyed?
A further consideration is that of second-order effects, not least of all in terms of the laws of armed conflict. Legal issues surrounding previous and current RF and laser weaponry have to be taken into account in development and integration plans. In the case of the latter, a protocol on blinding laser weapons was adopted in , which might need to be revisited as more powerful laser systems enter service. For HPM systems, meanwhile, there are potential issues related to unanticipated, follow-on collateral effects, as opposed to collateral damage.
In both technology areas, a key challenge for policymakers and legal experts is the speed of developments, which are, in many cases, outpacing current conceptual and legal frameworks.
These concerns will need to be addressed as DE systems finally move out of the test environment and into broader operational service, instead of the niche applications that have typified their roles so far. In the near term, DE systems will be drawn first into the wider inventory as complements to, rather than as replacements for, kinetic weapons.
This level of ambition means that the capabilities deployed initially will be considerably more modest than some of the systems envisaged in the s and s. The defence-technology base was at that time incapable of delivering systems that provided robust and reusable operational utility, and was hampered by poweroutput and beam-steering demands it could not meet.
This lowering of ambitions at least initially means that DE weapons are finding a path into active service, and it is only in the course of their fielding and use that the true operational and transformational aspects of these technologies will become clear.
Military space systems: US ambitions to secure space Once the exclusive domain of the Cold War superpowers, national space capabilities are now maintained by a growing number of countries.
Eleven states have an indigenous capacity to launch satellites, while operate satellites or have a financial interest in a satellite constellation. Along with the established space-operating nations of the United States, Russia, France, the United Kingdom, Germany and Israel, nations such as China and India now possess significant, and in some cases growing, space capabilities.
While its early uses were dominated by nationalsecurity tasks, space is now of far broader economic, commercial and military importance.
Russias Glonass offers a similar capability, and Europe has successfully launched four of its Galileo timing and navigation spacecraft into orbit. Recent commercial uses of space include the earth-observation collections from DigitalGlobe and others that drive imagery products such as Google Maps.
Satellites providing these services are in lowEarth orbit LEO ; spacecraft in geosynchronous orbit GEO provide television and communications services. However, the vulnerability of space systems to deliberate or inadvertent damage or interference is an increasing concern, not least in Washington, as the US seeks to sustain and protect those satellite systems that are not only central to its commercial and economic security, but also at the core of its military infrastructure.
Military uses of space have grown substantially in the years since the first satellite, Sputnik, orbited the Earth. Over the years, armed forces have increasingly relied on space-based systems for navigation, targeting, surveillance and communications.
Reconnaissance satellites, for instance, typically operate in LEO often within km of Earth while critical ballistic-missile warning and communications payloads operate in GEO, roughly 35,km away from the surface of the planet. However, both orbital regimes are under threat.
There is particular concern about intentional and inadvertent radiofrequency jamming, as well as anti-satellite ASAT or. For the US armed forces, the perceived vulnerability of space-based systems is of increasing concern. Shelton also highlighted the potential of high-powered lasers to affect payload operation.
Some lasers have the potential to blind electro-optical reconnaissance satellites see p. Beijing destroyed its own Fengyun 1C polar-orbiting weather satellite with what was thought to be an SC missile, based on the DF CSS-5 intermediate-range ballistic missile.
This resulted in a large debris field, much of which remains in orbit and has prompted numerous manoeuvres by satellite operators in order to avoid secondary collisions in space. China has continued to refine its capabilities since then, and is believed to have executed an attempted engagement of a ballistic missile in In contrast, Chinas state-run news agency claimed the test was a missile intercept.
Western analysts believe that Beijing is investing significant resources in technologies and techniques to influence operations in space. If anything, these discussions are only illustrative of the concern expressed by the US government and its allies that space services are vulnerable. Dealing with space debris Space debris is a recognised issue affecting space-faring nations, but dealing with it remains a singular concern.
Multilateral consultation on the ICOC drew to a close in , with EU member states then discussing how best to proceed. In addressing the debris issue, the language of the draft ICOC called for nations to refrain from any action which brings about, directly or indirectly, damage or destruction of space objects unless such action is justified: Signatories would in effect be foregoing carrying out any trials of anti-satellite systems that involved the kinetic.
As a consequence of perceived threats, greater resources are being directed towards securing access to, and operations in, space. One public US initiative aims to better characterise objects in space, including debris and spacecraft. Indeed, US officials have admitted that for decades their armed forces had operated nearly blind in space, relying only on dots and streaks of data on objects in orbit provided by ageing terrestrial radars.
In the last few years, however, there have been advances in hardware specifically designed to improve space situational awareness SSA. It is thought that most activity related to space security remains classified.
Under this programme, two satellites were launched on 28 July These would drift in GEO, collecting intelligence on other objects. Pentagon sources have stated that GSSAP is expected to begin delivering information early in ; first light the first instance of data gathering has already been achieved. According to senior US officials, these satellites were in part crafted as a deterrent to would-be rivals in space, who once.
There have been occasions where satellites have had to take avoiding action because of the danger of collision with debris. While China has not replicated this test, it has continued to trial the interceptor, including a test in July , according to the US State Department. Along with avoiding, or at least minimising, the creation of additional debris, there remains the challenge of dealing with the debris that is already in low-Earth orbit.
One option remains the use of orbital systems to collect the larger and more threatening pieces. Such technology, however, is problematic in that it is inherently dual use, and could be perceived as posing a threat to other satellites were such a capability to be operated on a national basis.
Holt in Exmouth, Western Australia. Slated to begin operating in , the SST will, according to DARPA, provide much faster discovery and tracking of previously unseen, hard-to-find small objects in geosynchronous orbits.
Its advanced electro-optical sensor is specifically designed to collect imagery of small satellites; threats posed by highly manoeuvrable small and micro satellites are of concern to the US and its allies. Although this system is projected to come out of service in , the follow-on programme is unlikely to achieve first launch before FY Washington is also improving the terrestrial radars used for SSA. A new Space Fence S-band active electronically scanned array is due to begin operating in These radar assets are sited to provide intelligence on Chinese launches, specifically those from the Taiyuan Satellite Launch Centre.
Until recently, the US lacked the ability to conduct continuous tracking of Chinese payloads launched into certain orbits. These radar upgrades will improve Washingtons understanding of activity in space, making it easier to attribute actions there. Diplomatic agreements with space operators to deter irresponsible or hostile behaviour are known to exist, but only attribution can allow the US and its allies to properly apply diplomatic pressure and, if needed, military force in reaction to hostile acts against space assets.
Absent from the public dialogue are technologies fielded to respond to threats. One is the United States Counter Communications System, designed to deny an adversary the ability to access friendly military-satellite communications.
Little has been revealed about the technology, but since it has been operated by the 4th Space Control Squadron at Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado. This system was designed to detect, characterize, geolocate and report sources of interference to allied communications systems in the region and, according to the USAF, consists of a. During operations, data was relayed to teams that would physically locate, identify and nullify the interference.
A so-called Counter Surveillance and Reconnaissance System, which was conceived of more than ten years ago to impede an adversarys access to space-based reconnaissance assets, disappeared from US budget documents in , suggesting that it was either terminated or classified so that funding accounts for continued work could be hidden. The US has also been exploring alternative propulsion systems for its workhorse Atlas V twostage expendable launch vehicle.
In increased tensions between Washington and Moscow prompted Dmitry Rogozin, Russias deputy prime minister, to state that he would cut off the supply of engines used for military purposes. Although the threat had not been fulfilled by October , it caused concern in Washington and, after months of wrangling, Congress was assessing whether to fund an alternative Atlas V engine.
The private companys Falcon 9 v1. Rogozin made his threat around the same time that the lawsuit was filed, calling into question the USAFs future launch strategy. The various challenges to US space security, which range from the increasing congestion of space to offensive actions by other states, have led Washington to see its space-based systems as increasingly vulnerable.
This has prompted the development of a range of monitoring capacities, both earthbound and spacebased, in a bid to improve SSA. But the US has also taken other steps. For instance, there has been some focus on increasing resilience by considering different constellation architectures. This might result in a move away from the multiple payload, big satellite construct into a less complex satellite architecture. It could mean that payloads are distributed across multiple platforms.
Perceived vulnerabilities are also leading Washington to assess its level of military dependence on space, including its ability to operate in degraded information environments, such as one in which access to GPS is reduced. As a result, there has been some scrutiny of established technologies that could minimise the effects of vulnerabilities on.
For example, inertial guidance is being revisited, including technologies such as terrain mapping and the miniaturisation of atomic clocks. There is also a focus on hardening existing technology to minimise the risk of electromagnetic attack, and of GPS degradation or spoofing, in which false readings perhaps imperceptible to the operator may be generated by an adversary seeking to degrade satellite capabilities.
Hybrid warfare: The sophisticated combinations of conventional and unconventional means of warfare deployed by Russia, seen by many analysts as a form of hybrid warfare, have demonstrated that policymakers need to take these activities into account when crafting new concepts and re-examining existing strategies.
Concerns over hybrid warfare are manifest for states in the West particularly those in NATO, whose Eastern members feel threatened by the combination of an assertive Russia and its capacity to rapidly seize territory. Meanwhile, Alliance members are again engaged on military operations in the Middle East, where additional anxieties have been prompted by the blend of conventional light infantry, part-insurgent and part-terrorist tactics employed by the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham ISIS , fuelled by illicit oil sales and criminal activity.
Furthermore, in some areas, such as the employment of coercive information operations, the versions of hybrid warfare employed in these very different theatres, by very different actors, display some similarities. As part of a cohesive response to these challenges, and in order to deter or defend against state or nonstate actors employing hybrid warfare, NATO, its members, and partner states must be able to develop, implement and adapt strategies combining diplomatic, military, informational, economic and lawenforcement efforts.
The lessons are broader, however. Western policymakers may anticipate that some current or potential state or non-state adversaries will also learn from these hybrid-warfare activities, potentially including states in East Asia or the Middle East. They might discern, simply, what tactics worked and what capabilities are required to effect results; other lessons might derive from perceptions of how Western governments and armed forces have reacted and adapted, politically as well as militarily.
These lessons might not necessarily be applied in conflicts with Western states, but their potential to rapidly destabilise could, if applied in other zones of political and military competition, mean they have global ramifications. In the years immediately following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, NATO faced a crisis of confidence over its future role and its capabilities capabilities weakened by reduced defence budgets and uncertain policy ambitions.
NATO forces, trained to fight against a conventional threat, faced questions of relevance as conflicts emerged outside Alliance borders, leading to a debate about out of area missions. However, the Alliance, and its member states, cannot return to Cold War concepts. There is particular concern about gaps in the Wests ability to counter Russias employment of what has been labelled variously as hybrid, ambiguous or non-linear warfare: Although this problem is not new, some of the means available to Russia and others to support proxies and subvert governments are innovative.
During the 45 September NATO Summit in Wales, much of the discussion centred on what to do about new threats that test the Alliances ability to deter and, if necessary, respond to hostile actions against member states. In particular, the Alliance identified the need to counter hostile non-military as well as military actions while defending member states against campaigns that combine conventional and unconventional operations.
NATO has identified the threat of hybrid warfare as particularly dangerous because such an approach operates in grey areas that exploit seams in the Alliance. While NATO may be militarily prepared for traditional territorial conflict, it is less prepared for sophisticated campaigns that combine low-level conventional and special operations; offensive cyber and space actions; and psychological operations that use social and traditional media to influence popular perception and international opinion.
Perhaps most dangerous to NATO, adversaries might attack Alliance cohesiveness and magnify possible political divisions. Campaigns against NATO states could begin with efforts to shape the political, economic and social landscape through subversion, espionage and propaganda. An example of this tactic could be an appeal for the protection of ethnic minorities, similar to concerns expressed by Moscow over elements of the population in Eastern Ukraine, and the rapid formation of pressure groups that might be locally staffed, but externally directed and supported.
The urgency for NATO to develop responses to these threats has been heightened due to Russias aggressive application of hybrid warfare, particularly because of the fear, among those newer NATO members who might feel more vulnerable to Russian actions, that they could be directed against them. In developing responses to hybrid warfare, policymakers might first look to the past, and to the history of the Cold War in particular. Russian conduct of hybrid warfare is grounded in maskirovka, the Soviet doctrine of denial and deception, featuring deniability, concealment, deception and disinformation, to accomplish political objectives.
The current incarnation of maskirovka has received modern updates. Today, Russia has developed an ability to shape political, economic and social environments through division, subversion, espionage, information operations and social tension. As Russias Chief of the General Staff General Valery Gerasimov observed in , the means of achieving political and strategic goals has grown, and, in many cases, they have exceeded the power of force of weapons in their effectiveness.
These new means include the use of cyber warfare, entertainment television, business groups and social media to influence popular will and perception. There was evidence of cyber attacks on Ukrainian systems in , including the reported insertion of an espionage tool called Snake, although as an example of cyber warfare the Ukraine crisis appeared muted in comparison with previous attacks, such as that by Russia on Estonia in To prevail in what is a psychological and political contest supported by military operations, states and international organisations like NATO must.
Deterring and countering hybrid warfare will require states to improve capabilities in the information domain as well as strengthening military readiness and forward defence. For NATO, this should also involve building upon recent work on the comprehensive approach, its recognition that effective response to crises must combine civilian and military instruments.
Hybrid warfare entails the pursuit of psychological effects both on the target nation and internationally, and so Western states and NATO might improve their ability to clarify intentions; counter enemy disinformation and propaganda; bolster the resolve and cohesion of the nation or nations under attack; and expose the actions and duplicity of the enemy.
For instance, quick action to counter Russias narrative of its right to protect pro-Russian and Russian-speaking populations seems particularly important.
Because deception has been employed to foster confusion and achieve deniability, it will be important for intelligence efforts to establish the foundation for information campaigns. Compelling intelligence products will help deny the enemys ability to use ambiguity to avoid sanction.
Intelligence will also be a critical component of countering efforts to sow dissension, doubt and division within and among nations. Influence agents working on behalf of adversaries could be systematically and publically exposed. For NATO, better coordination of the informational efforts of member nations, as well as those of international organisations such as the European Union, might improve speed of action while magnifying the Alliances voice, but in many Western countries these.
The most important focus for NATO, to deter Russia in particular, might lie in strengthening the readiness of its military forces. That is because the Russian application of hybrid warfare in Ukraine is essentially an effort to wage limited war for limited objectives.
Moscow believes that those limited objectives are attainable at an acceptable cost. South Korea. Vietnam has started to receive its Kilo-class boats from Russia. In Syria. Australia is assessing the Soryu-class as a possible replacement for its existing submarines. Coalition air operations may lead to tactical victories against ISIS — especially when they enable progress by fighters opposed to it — but they cannot inflict strategic defeat on the group.
In The 60 frigates and destroyers in service in had less than anti-ship and surface-to-air missile tubes between them. PAGE 3 OF 4 designed in equal measure to intimidate and open seams in the coalition will also require lasting.
Armament has also improved. Complex security dynamics across the region meant that regional defence spending was already high. Military successes on the part of ISIS galvanised a US-led coalition into launching airstrikes against the jihadi movement in Iraq and also in northern Syria.
In Iraq. Submarines remain a key requirement for states across Asia. The strategy of giving extended air support to local allies has certainly played a part in breaking the strategic momentum that ISIS created through the summer of Iran also provided air support to Iraq. It is clear that American allies on the ground. The upcoming push to retake Mosul. Intelligence services have to concentrate heavily on the threats posed to European societies by returning jihadists.
Following a flurry of new naval programmes. Notable exceptions include Cuba. India 9. Given this trend. France 7. Japan In these increases Of course spending is only part of the picture.
The facts quality of personnel and decades of accumulated military and analysis concerning national military capabilities training and operational experience.
The relative position of countries will vary not only as a result of actual adjustments in defence spending levels. North Korea and Syria. As we enter this state of affairs is more and discretionaryNorth spending. Australia Africa South Korea United States 2. France Western states will look to retain a The West still spent more than half of global defence Iraq United Kingdom Brazil So while defence investment gaps are closing.
The use of average exchange rates reduces these fluctuations. China 3. Israela It also relates to the public information on military capabilities. Opinions about the possible future superiority in the Black Sea diverge after both Turkey and Russia finish the modernization of their fleets. Moreover, Russia has already experienced delays in some ship construction caused by the necessity to substitute Ukrainian-made details Delanoe In early March , Putin suggested that Moscow deploy nuclear weapons in Crimea.
The Iskander tactical ballistic missile has a kilometer range and can reach not only the territory of Ukraine but also parts or Moldova, Romania and Turkey. Unfortunately, such concerns did not get serious publicity and discussions within the international institutions responsible for the security and military cooperation in Europe. Only European Parliament noted with concern that Russia has bolstered its air and naval defences in the Black Sea Basin consid- erably, deploying new naval defence anti-ship missiles and ensuring that Russian fighter planes control about three quarters of the Black Sea Basin airspace by practically tripling the number of airports in Crimea European Parliament Iskander missiles can carry both conventional and nuclear payload, while the use of the latter is difficult to imagine without full-fledged war involving all littoral states.
Both were aimed at cooperation in a specific sphere — navy, in a limited geography — the Black Sea, and were it was perceived as a positive element of military cooperation between the regional states, given that some participants had competing interests or conflicting views towards security. For several years already, experts have been pointing to the necessity to unite efforts and capacities of the two initiatives.
However, this process has not started, and in a current situation, its implementation will be beyond the possible. With the development of the Ukrainian crisis, it is possible to state that future cooperation in the current formats very unlikely at best, as Ukraine and Russia have been participating in both.
The creation of a new format is not being considered yet, the Russian Federation excluded, so all the other states can concentrate on their cooperation within the NATO framework. Turkish officials usually argued that the Black Sea security should be provided by the littoral countries of the Black Sea. Instead of in- creasing the U. In this regard, Russia and Turkey found a perfect compromise, preventing others from becoming involved in regional affairs.
The Romanian disagreement to such a state was mostly ignored. Turkish dominance in the Black Sea and desire to lead and have an overview of the region, resulted in a situation when in there was almost an absence of under- standing of the threats and challenges in the Black Sea region by the NATO authorities. Despite the regular navy and military trainings, they have resulted neither in a strategy or in action plan in case of a crisis.
Changes triggered by the illegal annexation of Crimea raised awareness among many European states, which believed that the EU must have a security response and re- consider its foreign and security policies, which must be reflected in a reviewed European Security Strategy, European Maritime Security Strategy and the EU Strategy for the Black Sea European Parliament No such reaction was noted within the NATO frame- work, which considered the Black Sea risks in a wider European context, emphasizing and enhancing security in the Baltics and at the Eastern flank, with the sea mostly left for the individual countries initiatives.
An Atlantic Council expert insists that NATO possesses economic and technological superiority over Russia, that does not translate into a regional military superiority that is sufficient to deter Russia, as it lacks an adequate policy, force structure, coordination, and command and control system in the Black Sea region Cohen Russian-Turkish relations and the Montreux Convention Neither the Russian-Georgian conflict of , nor the illegal annexation of Crimea had a serious influence on the Russian-Turkish relations.
It has been Syria and conflicting interests of the two partners that shook and almost derailed their engagement. In the opinion of the Russian military analyst Pavel Felgenhauer, it seems clear that Putin was sure that the Turks would be amenable and somehow the two countries would divide things up, that was a fundamental mistake Coalson Additional reason for such considerations was Turkish adherence to the Montreux Convention and previous behavior during the Russian-Georgian conflict in August Ankara is strongly opposed to any initiative that might imply a change in the sta- tus of the convention or that could disturb the maritime status quo in the Black Sea region.
Some experts suggests that with both countries prominently present in the Black Sea, the possibilities for more dangerous incidents are high Coalson This rift in Russian-Turkish relations presented a chance for the deeper NATO involve- ment in the Black Sea region, and for search of new security configurations and partner- ships in the region.
According to some opinions, in the case of the Black Sea, Russia can concentrate its forces in a relatively small area to gain advantage, whereas NATO has limited access to these waters largely because of the stipulations in the Montreux Convention, which limits the naval presence of non-littoral states in the Black Sea Bugajski and Doran As a result, most of the research compares only Russian-Turkish military balance in the Black Sea region, not considering the cumulative efforts of three NATO littoral member states that have currently received stimulus for enhanced cooperation both on bilateral and multilateral basis.
Some experts propose the establishment of a NATO regional command capable of coordinating all defensive activities in the theater Cohen In addition, Ukraine and Turkey received a chance to add significant military and security component to their relations, which were mostly based on economic interests. As for the Russian Federation, the Black Sea region is not perceived as a separate region, but as a part of the Black Sea-Mediterranean zone, so the operation is impossible without smooth passage of Bosporus and Dardanelle.
Despite the demonstration of force by launching missiles from the Caspian Sea to reach targets in Syria BBC , possibil- ities of such operations are very limited and not very effective in the current combat situ- ation.
However, in the opinion of the US officials: In some way, it was a response to the proposals to close the Black Sea straits to the Russian Fleet, so as not to allow the Crimean base to be used as a headquarters for the Syrian operation.
The strike from the Caspian Fleet against Syria proved that closing the straits is not an option, either from the legal point of view or the strategic one. For years, there were definitions of the Black Sea — Caspian cooperation, or the Black Sea-Mediterranean marine system, but in terms of security, it is time to consider the three seas as one geographic unit.
The Black Sea region is returning to the times of confrontation that has exist- ed during the Cold War, but with a new paradigm of regional relations. Militarization of Crimea, the possibility for nuclear weapon deployment, changes in the spheres of naviga- tion responsibility, navy modernization in Romania, Ukraine and Georgia, break in the Russian-Turkish relations are just a few elements of the new evolving order. As all regional countries are currently considering the modernization of their navy and increasing training, one of the conclusions can be that most of the tasks can be accomplished by smaller ships but with a proper equipment and rapid reaction capability.
The deployment of big warships within the Black Sea waters is more an issue of prestige rather than effectiveness. However, their existence should be considered in case the con- flict spreads to the Mediterranean.
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